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Memory enclaves with software configuration information   
ABSTRACT
Software guard extensions (SGX) allow an application to instantiate within memory a 
protected container, referred to as an enclave. An enclave is an area in the address space of an 
application that provides confidentiality and integrity even in presence of software of higher 
privilege, even if such software is malicious. The protection is achieved by restricting non-
enclave accesses to code/data resident in the enclave, and by enforcing execution integrity for 
the enclave.  An enclave has an identity, which comprises, for example, a hash of the code 
resident in the enclave, hash of a key with which the enclave was signed, a product version 
number and product category assigned by the software vendor, a hardware configuration of the 
enclave, etc. Within SGX, there are hardware-based mechanisms to attest to the identity of an 
enclave. There are also mechanisms to derive, using software and hardware, keys tied to a 
portion of the identity of the enclave. However, at present, there is no provision for enclave 
software to record the identity of its own configuration, or to seal secrets based on such 
recorded values. This disclosure describes mechanisms that allow enclave software to record 
and seal its configuration identity. 
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BACKGROUND
Cloud computing services enable a customer to provide software code to be executed on 
a computer provided by the cloud computing service provider. A customer may need to verify 
that such code and customer data is kept off-limits, e.g., from other customers that use the cloud 
computing service, the cloud computing service provider itself, etc. aside from access as 
explicitly authorized by the customer.
Fig. 1: An enclave within an address space of an application loaded by a customer on a remote 
server
Secure remote computing is the problem of executing software on a remote computer, 
e.g., a computer that is owned and operated by an untrusted party. Fig. 1 illustrates an example 
of secure remote computing. A customer connects using a client computer (102) to a remote 
computer (104) via a network (106) and uploads data and code to the remote computer. The 
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remote computer may be untrusted, and the customer may want to verify that the uploaded data 
and code are secure, and used only in accordance with explicit authorization. Software guard 
extensions (SGX) solve this problem of secure remote computing by leveraging trusted 
hardware in the remote computer. The trusted hardware may comprise a processor (108) and 
memory (110). Within memory of the remote computer is established a secure container, 
known as an enclave (112). A customer of the remote computation service uploads code and 
data into the secure container. The trusted hardware protects the confidentiality and integrity of 
such code and data during computation. 
An enclave is a restricted access execution environment. Access to an enclave's memory 
is restricted to software resident within the enclave and is prevented to software not resident in 
the enclave. Even software running at higher privilege levels, including malware, is not 
permitted access to the enclave. The enclave remains protected and provides confidentiality and 
integrity guarantees, even when, for example, the BIOS, Virtual Machine Manager (VMM) or 
hypervisor, Operating System (OS) or kernel, drivers, etc. are compromised. Even adversaries 
that possess full execution control over the remote computer are prevented from accessing code 
and data that are in the enclave, or tampering with execution of the enclave.
An enclave validates its integrity by using hardware-based mechanisms to respond to 
attestation challenges. Attestation proves to remote software that it is communicating with a 
specific piece of software running in a secure container hosted by trusted hardware. The proof 
is a cryptographic signature that verifies the identity of the contents of the secure container, 
which may comprise hash of the contents of the secure container, or a signature over the 
contents of the container, or some combination thereof. When the identity of the contents of an 
enclave, provided in response to a challenge, does not match an expected response, a customer 
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of the remote-computation service can elect, for example, to not load further data or code into 
the enclave, or take other actions. Conversely, verification of the identity provides a high 
degree of certitude that the enclave is trustworthy.
For example, a customer that utilizes a cloud service for data analysis operations may 
desire to ensure that access to the execution code as well as data be restricted from other 
customers and the cloud service provider itself. Further, customers that utilize cloud services 
may also verify that a correct version (e.g., a verified untampered version) of execution code 
was applied in the processing of the data, e.g., to guarantee that output of the data analysis is 
reliable.
An enclave is managed via a collection of data structures. For example, the identity of 
an enclave is defined within a data structure known as the SGX Enclave Control Structure 
(SECS). The SECS has several fields that keep a track of the identity, e.g., a MISCSELECT 
field, an ATTRIBUTES field, an MRENCLAVE field, an MRSIGNER field, an ISVPRODID 
field, an ISVSVN field, etc. However, at present, fields that pertain to the identity do not record 
the configuration of the software running inside an enclave. Such fields are also not usable to 
provision or seal secrets based on the recorded value. Lack of such fields precludes a customer 
from launching an enclave written/signed by one vendor, and customizing that enclave to their 
own needs based on security-sensitive configuration information (e.g., public key of the 
customer's smart card). 
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DESCRIPTION
This disclosure describes techniques that enable recording of software configuration 
within the enclave identity, thereby making software configuration part of the enclave identity. 
For example, two fields are introduced that pertain to software configuration. The two fields 
may be inserted in a data structure that manages the enclave, e.g., the SECS data structure. 
The first of the two fields is referred to as SWCFGNONMONOTONIC, which may, for 
example, span 256 bits. Any entity that requires checking of software configuration can 
perform a comparison with SWCFGNONMONOTONIC to verify an exact match with 
expectation. For example, software executing on a customer’s on premise computers, or 
software executing in other enclaves (e.g., on a computer of the remote-computation service 
provider) can perform such verification. 
The second of the two fields is referred to as SWCFGMONOTONIC, which may, for 
example, be 32 bits wide. The field SWCFGMONOTONIC is greater than or equal to the 
expected value. Any entity that requires checking of software configuration can perform a 
comparison with SWCFGMONOTONIC to verify that SWCFGMONOTONIC is greater than 
or equal to an expected value. 
Access to the above two fields may be enabled by extending the instruction set of a 
processor that provides the enclave to enable software code write to these two fields in a write-
once fashion. The write-once semantics of these fields ensure that subsequent attempts to write 
to these fields cause a failure, either by way of error or exception. For example, when software 
is initially loaded to an enclave, a configuration is provided as an input to the enclave. The 
fields as described herein are programmed (e.g., assigned values) based on the configuration 
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prior to the software execution. Since the fields are write once, a bad software configuration is 
not able to rewrite the fields in the enclave, e.g., with incorrect values. For example, if such 
software attempts to load a dynamic library to the enclave, e.g., a library that attempts to change 
values of the fields, rewriting the fields to hide the fact that a bad library was loaded is 
prevented.
Within the SGX instructions, there is a leaf function ENCLU[EREPORT]. Leaf 
functions are those that don’t call other functions. The leaf function ENCLU[EREPORT] can 
only be executed inside an enclave and creates a cryptographic report of the enclave. Per 
techniques of this disclosure, the ENCLU[EREPORT] leaf function is extended to include in 
the hardware-generated report contents of the fields SWCFGMONOTONIC and 
SWCFGNONMONOTONIC. 
Within the SGX instructions, there is also a leaf function ENCLU[EGETKEY], which 
returns a secret key from the processor-specific key hierarchy. ENCLU[EGETKEY] derives 
keys using a value unique to a processor in order to create a specific key. ENCLU[EGETKEY] 
can only be executed inside an enclave. An input to the ENCLU[EGETKEY] function is a data 
structure known as KEYREQUEST, which is used to select from one of the processor-specific 
keys, and set additional parameters required in the derivation of the selected key. Within the 
KEYREQUEST data structure is another data structure known as KEYPOLICY. Fig. 2 
illustrates the data structures KEYREQUEST and KEYPOLICY. 
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Fig. 2: Fields of the KEYREQUEST and KEYPOLICY data structures, and their mutual 
relationship (from [1])
Per techniques of this disclosure, the KEYREQUEST data structure is extended to add a 
SWCFGMONOTONIC field, which may be, for example, 32 bits wide. Further, per techniques 
disclosed herein, the KEYPOLICY data structure is extended to add a SWCFG bit. An example 
illustration of the resulting KEYREQUEST and KEYPOLICY data structures is shown in Fig. 
3.
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Fig. 3: An example modification of the KEYREQUEST and KEYPOLICY data structures, per 
techniques of this disclosure.
Once input to the ENCLU[EGETKEY] function is modified, for example, as shown in Fig. 
3, the behavior of the ENCLU[EGETKEY] leaf function is defined in accordance with the 
following rules:
1. If the KEYPOLICY→SWCFG bit is set, then two enclaves with different values of 
SECS→SWCFGNONMONOTONIC get cryptographically independent keys, 
irrespective of other portions of identities of the two enclaves. That is, if the 
KEYPOLICY→SWCFG bit is set, then the key returned by the ENCLU[EGETKEY] 
leaf function is bound to the software configuration portion of the enclave identity.  
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2. Two ENCLU[EGETKEY] invocations, either from the same enclave or from different 
enclaves, with two different values of KEYREQUEST→SWCFGMONOTONIC result 
in cryptographically independent keys, irrespective of the other portions of the identity.  
3. An ENCLU[EGETKEY] invocation succeeds if and only if the 
KEYREQUEST→SWCFGMONOTONIC has a value that is less than or equal to that 
of SECS→SWCFGMONOTONIC.  
These extensions are similar to the functionality of the ENCLU[EGETKEY] leaf with regard to 
MRSIGNER, ISVPRODID, ISVSVN, etc. portions of enclave identity. Similar extensions are 
made to enclaves that attest to the identity of another enclave.
Modifications to the SGX instruction set, as described above, enable software running 
inside an enclave to record the identity of its configuration, that is not otherwise captured by 
existing enclave identity semantics. Further, per techniques described herein, secrets may be 
sealed and/or provisioned based on the recorded value.
Per this disclosure, the hardware does not assign any specific meaning to the value of 
SWCFGNONMONOTONIC. It is completely up to the enclave software and the remote 
customer software to assign a meaning to SWCFGNONMONOTONIC. Also, the hardware is 
configured only for the monotonic nature of the SWCFGMONOTONIC field to be valid. The 
hardware configuration does not assign any specific meaning to SWCFGMONOTONIC, other 
than for the monotonic relationship between the two fields to be valid. 
CONCLUSION
This disclosure describes techniques to record the configuration or identity of software 
running within an enclave, which is a secure container within the memory of a computer. For 
example, two fields are added to a data structure that manages the enclave. The first of the two 
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fields serves to verify an exact match of software configuration with expectation. The second of 
the two fields serves to verify that the field is greater than or equal to expectation. 
Modifications in the data structure and leaf functions are proposed to support the functionalities 
described herein. Per techniques of this disclosure, software executing inside an enclave can 
record the identity of its configuration, and provision/seal secrets based on the recorded value. 
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